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Abstract
In this paper we propose an information-theoretic approach to the access control problem in a scenario where a group of users
is divided into a number of disjoint classes. The set of rules that specify the information ﬂow between different user classes in the
system deﬁnes an access control policy. An access control policy can be implemented by using a key assignment scheme, where a
trusted central authority (CA) assigns an encryption key and some private information to each class.
We consider key assignment schemes where the key assigned to each class is unconditionally secure with respect to an adversary
controlling a coalition of classes of a limited size. Our schemes are characterized by a security parameter r, the size of the adversary
coalition.We show lower bounds on the size of the private information that each class has to store and on the amount of randomness
needed by the CA to set up any key assignment scheme. Finally, we propose some optimal constructions for unconditionally secure
key assignment schemes.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Key assignment schemes; Access control policy; Unconditional security
1. Introduction
The access control problem deals with the speciﬁcation of users’ access permission and is a fundamental issue in
any system that manages distributed resources, such as e-newspaper, pay-TV subscription services, etc. The access
control problem is deﬁned in a scenario where the users of a computer system are organized in a certain number of
disjoint classes, called security classes. A security class can represent a person, a department, or a user group in an
organization. The set of rules that specify the information ﬂow between different user classes in the system deﬁnes an
access control policy. In particular, for any class in the system, the access control policy speciﬁes the set of classes
which can be accessed by that class. This set is called the accessible set of the class.
Within the scope of cryptography, an access control policy can be implemented by using a key assignment scheme,
that is, a method to assign a key and some private information to each class. The encryption key will be used by each
class to protect its data by means of a symmetric cryptosystem. The private information will be used by each class to
compute the keys assigned to its accessible set. This assignment is carried out by a central authority, the CA, which is
active only at the distribution phase.
In a perfectly secure key assignment scheme the key assigned to each class is secure against a coalition of all the
classes which are not entitled to access its secret data, i.e., even pooling together their private information, they cannot
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compute anything about that key. The basic and straightforward perfectly secure key assignment scheme requires each
class to memorize the encryption keys assigned to all classes in its accessible set. The disadvantage of this solution is
that it penalizes users in classes with large accessible sets, since they need to handle more information than users in
classes with smaller accessible sets. Given the high complexity of such a scheme, a natural step is to trade complexity
for security. We may still require that the key assigned to each class is unconditionally secure, but only with respect to
an adversary controlling a coalition of classes of a limited size.
1.1. Related work
The problem of reducing the inherent complexity of the basic straightforward key assignment scheme was ﬁrst
considered by Akl and Taylor [1], who proposed an elegant solution to solve the access control problem in a system
organized as a partially ordered hierarchy (poset). In their scheme, each class is assigned a key that can be used,
along with some public parameters generated by a central authority, to compute the key assigned to any class lower
down in the hierarchy. Subsequently, many researchers have proposed schemes that either have better performances or
allow inserting and deleting classes in the hierarchy (e.g., [2,10–12,16–18,20,22]). All these schemes can be used to
implement only poset-based access control policies.
There are several examples of distributed systems requiring more general access control policies. For example, these
access control policies may violate the anti-symmetrical and transitive properties of a poset. The problem of designing
cryptographic key assignment schemes for access control policies with transitive and anti-symmetrical exceptions was
ﬁrst considered by Yeh et al. [25]. However, Hwang [13] showed that their scheme was insecure against collusion
attacks carried out by non-authorized classes. Subsequently, the authors of [8] proposed a general method to construct
a cryptographic key assignment scheme for any arbitrary access control policy.
The most used approach to key assignment schemes (different from the one proposed in this paper) is based on
unproven speciﬁc assumptions (e.g., [1–3,8,10–12,14,16–22]). We remark that our approach is information-theoretic
and indeed differs from the above computational approach since it does not depend on any unproven assumption.
1.2. Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we formally deﬁne key assignment schemes by using an information-theoretic approach. In Section 3 we
show lower bounds on the size of the private information held by each class and on the amount of randomness needed
by the CA to set up any key assignment scheme. The bounds are expressed in terms of a combinatorial parameter, the
length of the longest r-almost_covered sequence, i.e., the length of a sequence of classes satisfying some constraints
depending on the access control policy and on the size r of the adversary coalition. In Section 4 we show that, given an
access control policy and a security parameter r, the problem of computing the length of the longest r-almost_covered
sequence is computationally hard. In Section 5 we consider hierarchical key assignment schemes, i.e., key assignment
schemes where the access control policy is represented by a partially ordered hierarchy. In particular, in Section 5.2 we
consider key assignment schemes for an important kind of partially ordered hierarchy, the tree hierarchy. In Section 6
we propose some optimal constructions. Finally, in the appendix we review the basic concepts of Information Theory
used in our deﬁnitions and proofs.
2. The model
We consider a scenario where the users of a computer system are divided into a certain number of disjoint classes,
called security classes. The set of rules that specify the information ﬂow between different user classes in the system
deﬁnes an access control policy. An access control policy can be represented by a directed graph G = (V ,E), where
the vertex set V corresponds to the set of security classes and there is a directed edge (u, v) ∈ E if and only if class u
can access class v. Each class has a self-loop. For each u ∈ V , we deﬁne the accessible set of u as the set of classes
that can be accessed by u, including u itself, i.e., Au = {v ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}. We also deﬁne the forbidden set of u as
the set of classes that cannot access class u, i.e., Fu = {v ∈ V : u /∈Av}. For any subset of classes X ⊆ V , we denote
by A
X
the set
⋃
v∈XAv .
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Fig. 1. An arbitrary access control policy.
For example, consider the directed graph of Fig. 1, where self-loops are omitted. The accessible and forbidden sets
of each class are the following:
Aa = {a, b} Fa = {e, f },
Ab = {a, b, c, f } Fb = {c, d, e, f },
Ac = {a, c} Fc = {a, d, f },
Ad = {a, d, f } Fd = {a, b, c, f },
Ae = {c, d, e} Fe = {a, b, c, d, f },
Af = {f } Ff = {a, c, e}.
An access control policy represented by a directed graph G = (V ,E) can be implemented by using a key assignment
scheme, where a trusted third party, called the central authority (CA), has the task to assign a key and some private
information to each class u ∈ V . For any class u ∈ V , we denote by pu the private information sent by the CA to users
in class u and by ku the key assigned to class u, respectively. Moreover, we denote by Pu and Ku the sets of all possible
values that pu and ku can assume, respectively. Given a set X = {u1, . . . , u} ⊆ V , we denote by PX and KX the sets
Pu1 × · · · × Pu and Ku1 × · · · × Ku , respectively.
In this paper, with a boldface capital letter, say Y, we denote a random variable taking values on a set, denoted by
the corresponding capital letter Y, according to some probability distribution {PrY(y)}y∈Y . The values such a random
variable can take are denoted by the corresponding lower case letter. Given a random variable Y, we denote by H(Y)
the Shannon entropy of {PrY(y)}y∈Y (for some basic properties of the entropy, consult the appendix).
The most used approach to key assignment schemes (different from the one proposed in this paper) is based on
unproven speciﬁc assumptions (e.g., [1,2,8,10–12,16–18,20–22]).We remark that our approach is information-theoretic
and indeed differs from the above computational approach since it does not depend on any unproven assumption. The
sameapproachhas beenused in [7] to analyzehierarchical key assignment schemes, i.e., schemes realizing access control
policies represented by a partially ordered hierarchy. We consider key assignment schemes where the key assigned to
each class is unconditionally secure with respect to an adversary controlling a coalition of classes of a limited size.
Our schemes are characterized by a security parameter r, the size of the adversary coalition. The maximum value that
the security parameter r can assume is equal to maxu∈V |Fu|, since any adversary coalition for class u can contain at
most |Fu| classes. We formally deﬁne r-secure key assignment schemes by using the entropy function, mainly because
this leads to a compact and simple description of the schemes and because the entropy approach takes into account all
probability distributions on the keys assigned to the classes. An r-secure key assignment scheme is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1. Let G = (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents an arbitrary access control policy and let
1rmaxu∈V |Fu|. An r-secure key assignment scheme for G is a method to assign a key to each class in such a
way that the following two properties are satisﬁed:
(1) Any class allowed to access another class can compute the key assigned to that class.
Formally, for any u ∈ V and any v ∈ Au, it holds that
H(Kv|Pu) = 0.
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(2) Any coalition of at most r classes not allowed to access another class have absolutely no information about the
key assigned to that class.
Formally, for any u ∈ V and any X ⊆ Fu such that |X|r , it holds that
H(Ku|PX) = H(Ku).
3. Lower bounds
In this section we prove lower bounds on the size of the private information held by each class and on the number
of random bits needed by the CA to set up any r-secure key assignment scheme. In order to prove our results we need
the next deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 3.1. LetG=(V ,E) be the directed graph that represents an arbitrary access control policy and letX, Y ⊆ V .
In any r-secure key assignment scheme for G, if Y ⊆ AX we say that X covers Y.
Deﬁnition 3.2. Let G= (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents an arbitrary access control policy. In any r-secure
key assignment scheme for G, a sequence of classes u1 . . . um is called r-almost_covered if either m= 1, or m> 1 and
for any j = 2, . . . , m, there exists a set Xj ⊆ Fuj such that |Xj |r and Xj covers {u1, . . . , uj−1}.
Consider the graph shown in Fig. 1. It is easy to see that cbd and acb are 1-almost_covered sequences, whereas, acbf
and cbde are 2-almost_covered sequences.
The next lemma is an immediate consequence of Deﬁnition 3.2.
Lemma 3.3. Let G = (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents an arbitrary access control policy. In any r-secure
key assignment scheme for G, any r-almost_covered sequence is also r ′-almost_covered, for any r ′ >r .
The next lemma will be a useful tool to prove our results.
Lemma 3.4. Let G = (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents an arbitrary access control policy. In any r-secure
key assignment scheme for G, if u1u2 . . . um is an r-almost_covered sequence of classes, then it holds that
H(Ku1 . . .Kum) =
m∑
j=1
H(Kuj ).
Proof. Since u1u2 . . . um is an r-almost_covered sequence, from Deﬁnition 3.2 we have that, for any j = 2, . . . , m,
there exists a set Xj ⊆ Fuj such that Xj covers {u1, . . . , uj−1} and |Xj |r . Therefore, from 2. of Deﬁnition 2.1 it
holds that
H(Kuj |PXj ) = H(Kuj ). (1)
Since ui ∈ AXj for each i = 1, . . . , j − 1, it follows that there exists a class vi ∈ Xj such that ui ∈ Avi . Hence, from
1 of Deﬁnition 2.1 it follows that H(Kui |Pvi ) = 0 and from (A.7) we have that
H(Ku1 . . .Kuj−1 |PXj )
j−1∑
i=1
H(Kui |PXj )
j−1∑
i=1
H(Kui |Pvi ) = 0.
Hence, from (A.6) it follows that
H(Ku1 . . .Kuj−1 |Kuj PXj )H(Ku1 . . .Kuj−1 |PXj ) = 0. (2)
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Consider the mutual information I (Kuj ;Ku1 . . .Kuj−1 |PXj ). From (A.5) it holds that
H(Kuj |PXj ) − H(Kuj |Ku1 . . .Kuj−1PXj )
= H(Ku1 . . .Kuj−1 |PXj ) − H(Ku1 . . .Kuj−1 |Kuj PXj ). (3)
Hence, from (2) and (3) it follows that
H(Kuj |Ku1 . . .Kuj−1PXj ) = H(Kuj |PXj ). (4)
Therefore, from (A.1) and (A.4) it holds that
H(Ku1 . . .Kum) = H(Ku1) +
m∑
j=2
H(Kuj |Ku1 . . .Kuj−1)
H(Ku1) +
m∑
j=2
H(Kuj |Ku1 . . .Kuj−1PXj )
= H(Ku1) +
m∑
j=2
H(Kuj |PXj ) (from (4))
=
m∑
j=1
H(Kuj ) (from (1)). 
The next theorem shows a lower bound on the size of the private information held by any subset of classes X ⊆ V .
Theorem 3.5. Let G= (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents an arbitrary access control policy. In any r-secure
key assignment scheme for G, for any X ⊆ V , if there exists an r-almost_covered sequence of classes u1 . . . um in AX ,
then it holds that
H(P
X
)
m∑
j=1
H(Kuj ).
Proof. Let X ⊆ V and let u1 . . . um be an r-almost_covered sequence of classes in AX =
⋃
v∈XAv . Since uj ∈ AX for
each j = 1, . . . , m, it follows that there exists a class vj ∈ X such that uj ∈ Avj . From 1 of Deﬁnition 2.1 it follows
that H(Kuj |Pvj ) = 0 and, from (A.7), we have that
H(Ku1 . . .Kum |PX)
m∑
j=1
H(Kuj |PX)
m∑
j=1
H(Kuj |Pvj ) = 0. (5)
Consider the mutual information I (P
X
;Ku1 . . .Kum). From (A.3) it holds that
H(P
X
) − H(P
X
|Ku1 . . .Kum) = H(Ku1 . . .Kum) − H(Ku1 . . .Kum |PX). (6)
Since H(P
X
|Ku1 . . .Kum)0, from (5) and (6) it follows that
H(P
X
)H(Ku1 . . .Kum).
Hence, the theorem follows from Lemma 3.4. 
In Deﬁnition 2.1 we did not make any assumption on the entropies of the random variables Ku and Kv , for different
classes u and v. For example, we could have either H(Ku)>H(Kv) or H(Ku)H(Kv). Our results apply to the
general case of arbitrary entropies of keys, but for clarity we state the next result for the simpler case that all entropies
of keys are equal, i.e. H(Ku) = H(Kv) for all u, v ∈ V . We denote this common entropy by H(K).
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The next corollary easily follows from Theorem 3.5 and states a lower bound on the size of the private information
held by each class in any r-secure key assignment scheme.
Corollary 3.6. Let G=(V ,E) be the directed graph that represents an arbitrary access control policy. In any r-secure
key assignment scheme for G, for any u ∈ V , if there exists an r-almost_covered sequence of length m in Au, then it
holds that
H(Pu)m · H(K).
In the following we deﬁne and analyze a measure for the amount of randomness needed by the CA to set up any
r-secure key assignment scheme. The measure for the amount of randomness is formally deﬁned by using the Shannon
entropy of the random variables generating the pieces distributed by the CA to the classes. The entropy is strictly
related to the measure of randomness introduced by Knuth and Yao [15]. Let A be an algorithm that generates the
probability distribution {PrX(x)}x∈X using only independent and unbiased random bits in input. Denote by T (A) the
average number of random bits used by the algorithm A and let T (X) = minAT (A). Knuth and Yao [15] proved the
following inequalities:
H(X)T (X)<H(X) + 2.
Thus, the entropy of a random source is very close to the average number of independent unbiased randombits necessary
to simulate the source.
In the following, given a directed graph G = (V ,E) representing an arbitrary access control policy, we denote by
H(P
V
) the amount of randomness needed by the CA to set up any r-secure key assignment scheme for G. The next
corollary states a lower bound on the size of the information generated by the CA to set up any r-secure key assignment
scheme.
Corollary 3.7. Let G=(V ,E) be the directed graph that represents an arbitrary access control policy. In any r-secure
key assignment scheme for G, if there exists an r-almost_covered sequence of length m in V, then it holds that
H(P
V
)mH(K).
Proof. Since A
V
=⋃v∈V Av = V , the corollary follows from Theorem 3.5. 
4. An NP-completeness result
From Theorem 3.5, given a directed graph G = (V ,E), in order to ﬁnd lower bounds on the size of the information
held by a subset of nodes X ⊆ V in any r-secure key assignment scheme for G, it is enough to ﬁnd the longest
r-almost_covered sequence in A
X
.
In this section we show that the problem of ﬁnding the longest r-almost_covered sequence in a graph is computa-
tionally hard. We restate Deﬁnition 3.2 in terms of graphs:
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let G= (V ,E) be a directed graph. A sequence of nodes u1u2 . . . um in G is called r-almost_covered
if, for any j = 2, . . . , m, there exists a set of nodes Xj such that |Xj |r , Xj covers {u1, u2, . . . , uj−1}, and there is
no edge from vertices in Xj to uj .
As a decision problem, given two integers r and k we ask whether an r-almost_covered sequence of length k exists
in a directed graph. The corresponding language is
ALMOST_COVERED_SEQUENCE = {〈G, r, k〉: the directed graph G has an r-almost_covered sequence of
length k}.
We prove the hardness of ALMOST_COVERED_SEQUENCE showing thatDOMINATING-SET can be reduced to
ALMOST_COVERED_SEQUENCE in polynomial time. LetG= (V ,E) be an undirected graph, we recall that Y ⊆ V
is a dominating set for G if for each v ∈ V/Y there exists a vertex u ∈ Y for which (u, v) ∈ E. As a language,
DOMINATING-SET= {〈G, r〉: the undirected graph G has a dominating set of size r}.
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Fig. 2. A graph G.
It is well known that DOMINATING_SET is an NP-complete problem [9]. In particular such a problem is NP-
complete for planar graphs with maximum vertex degree equal to three, while it is solvable in polynomial time for trees
[4,5]. The following theorem shows that ALMOST_COVERED_SEQUENCE is NP-complete.
Theorem 4.2. ALMOST_COVERED_SEQUENCE is NP-complete.
Proof. Weﬁrst show thatALMOST_COVERED_SEQUENCE ∈ NP.Supposeweare given adirectedgraphG=(V ,E)
and two integers k and r. The certiﬁcate we choose is constituted by a sequence u1 . . . uk and by a set Xj ⊆ V for
each j = 2, . . . , k. The veriﬁcation algorithm checks for each j = 2, . . . , k whether there is no edge from vertices in
Xj to uj and |Xj |r and whether Xj covers {u1, . . . , uj−1}. This veriﬁcation can be performed straightforwardly in
polynomial time.
We prove thatALMOST_COVERED_SEQUENCE is NP-hard by showing thatDOMINATING_SET can be reduced
to ALMOST_COVERED_SEQUENCE in polynomial time.
Given a graphG= (V ,E) and an integer r, we construct a directed graphG′ = (V ′, E′) that has an r-almost_covered
sequence of length |V | + 2 if and only if G has a dominating set of size r. Let V = {u1, . . . , u|V | }. The set of vertices
V ′ is equal to V ′ = V ∪ Q ∪ {z}, where Q =⋃|V |+1i=1 Vi and Vi = {uij : uj ∈ V }. The edge-set E′ is constituted by the
union of the following sets of edges:
• COPY_EDGES= {(uij , us) : (uj , us) ∈ E and i ∈ {1, . . . , |V | + 1}/{s}}.
• SELF_EDGES= {(uij , uj ) : i ∈ {1, . . . , |V | + 1}/{j} and uj ∈ V }.• COMPLETE_Q_EDGES= {(u, v) : u, v ∈ Q}.
• OUTGOING_z_EDGES= {(z, u) : u ∈ V ′}.
• SELF_LOOPS= {(u, u) : u ∈ V ′}.
As an example of this construction if we have the graph G in Fig. 2 then G′ is the graph shown in Fig. 3, where
the arrow from z to Q ∪ V in bold face represents the set of edges OUTGOING_z_EDGES. Moreover, the edges in
COMPLETE_Q_EDGES and in SELF_LOOPS are omitted.
The next properties follow by the deﬁnition of G′. First, observe that (uij , ui) /∈COPY_EDGES and (uii , ui) /∈
SELF_EDGES, for any i, j = 1, . . . , |V |. By inspection on the sets of edges in E′ it holds that (uij , ui) /∈E′, for
any i, j = 1, . . . , |V |. Therefore, it follows that
Property 1. Let ui ∈ V . There is no edge from vertices in Vi to ui .
Since Vi ⊆ Q for any i = 1, . . . , |V | + 1, from the deﬁnition of COMPLETE_Q_EDGES, we obtain
Property 2. Let u ∈ Q and let uij ∈ Vi . Then, (u, uij ) ∈ COMPLETE_Q_EDGES.
Since for each (us, uj ) ∈ E it holds that (u|V |+1s , uj ) ∈ COPY_EDGES and for each uj ∈ V it holds that (u|V |+1j , uj ) ∈
SELF_EDGES, it follows that
Property 3. Y ⊆ V is a dominating set of G if and only if the set Y|V |+1 = {u|V |+1k : uk ∈ Y } covers V in G′.
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Since for each (us, uj ) ∈ E it holds that (uis, uj ) ∈ COPY_EDGES, and for each ui it holds that (uji , ui) ∈
SELF_EDGES, for i ∈ {1, . . . , |V |}/{j}, it follows that
Property 4. If Y ⊆ V is a dominating set of G then the set Yj = {ujk : uk ∈ Y } covers V/{uj } in G′, for each
j = 1, . . . , |V |.
Since the node z has no incoming edge, with the exception of the self loop, it holds that
Property 5. The node z has no incoming edge from the vertices in Q ∪ V .
Since there is no outgoing edge from the nodes in V , with the exception of the self loops, and (u|V |+1j , uj ) ∈
SELF_EDGES, for any uj ∈ V , it holds that
Property 6. Let u ∈ V and uj ∈ V . If (uj , u) ∈ E′, then (u|V |+1j , u) ∈ E′.
From the deﬁnition of the sets COPY_EDGES and SELF_EDGES, it holds that
Property 7. Let u ∈ V and i ∈ {1, . . . , |V |}. If (uij , u) ∈ E′, then (u|V |+1j , u) ∈ E′.
Since there is no outgoing edge from vertices in V , with the exception of the self loops, it holds that:
Property 8. There is no edge from vertices in V to vertices in Q.
Now, we show that the transformation from 〈G, r〉 to 〈G′, r, k〉 is indeed a reduction: the graph G has a dominating
set of size r if and only if the graph G′ has an r-almost_covered sequence of length |V | + 2.
Suppose that G has a dominating set Y ⊆ V with |Y | = r . We claim that u11u1u2 . . . u|V |z is an r-almost_covered
sequence of length |V | + 2 in G′. Indeed, let X2 = {u11}. From Property 1, the edge (u11, u1) /∈E′, whereas (u11, u11) ∈
SELF_LOOPS. Moreover, let Xj = Yj−1 = {uj−1k : uk ∈ Y }, for j = 3, . . . , |V | + 2. From Property 1, there is
no edge from vertices in Xj to uj−1, for each j = 3, . . . , |V | + 1. Since Xj ⊆ Q and u11 ∈ Q, from Property 2
there exists an edge from each node in Xj to u11 and from Property 4, Xj covers {u1, u2, . . . , uj−2}. Hence, Xj covers{u11, u1, u2, . . . , uj−2}. Finally, from Property 5, there is no edge from vertices inX|V |+2 to z and sinceX|V |+2 ⊆ Q, from
Property 2 there exists an edge from each node in X|V |+2 to u11 and from Property 3, X|V |+2 covers {u1, u2, . . . , u|V | }.
Hence, X|V |+2 covers {u11, u1, u2, . . . , u|V | }. Therefore, there exists an r-almost_covered sequence in G′ of length|V | + 2.
Conversely, suppose thatG′ has an r-almost_covered sequence S of length |V |+2.We show that G has a dominating
set of size r. First, we prove two claims which are implied by the deﬁnition of G′ and by Deﬁnition 4.1.
Claim 1. Any r-almost_covered sequence in G′ of length |V |+2 is constituted by the |V |+1 nodes u1, u2, . . . , u|V | , z
(in some order) and by a node in Q.
Proof of Claim 1. Let W be an r-almost_covered sequence in G′ of length |V | + 2 and let vi be the ﬁrst node in W
that belongs to Q. Assume by contradiction that vj ∈ Q is a subsequent vertex in W. From Deﬁnition 4.1, there exists
a set X ⊆ V ′ such that there is no edge from vertices in X to vj whereas there exists an edge from a node v in X to vi .
From Property 8, v ∈ Q ∪ {z}. If v ∈ Q, since vj is in Q, it holds that (v, vj ) ∈ COMPLETE_Q_EDGES. If v = z, it
holds that (v, vj ) ∈ OUTGOING_z_EDGES. Therefore, it follows that (v, vj ) ∈ E′. Since v ∈ X, it holds that (v, vj )
is an edge from a vertex in X to vj . This is a contradiction.
Claim 2. Let W be an r-almost_covered sequence in G′. If z is in W, then it is the last node in W.
Proof of Claim 2. Assume by contradiction that z is in W and that a node u is the last node in the sequence W.
From Deﬁnition 4.1, there exists a set X of nodes such that there is no edge from vertices in X to u, whereas, there
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Fig. 3. The graphG′ corresponding to the graph in Fig. 2. The arrow from z toQ∪V in bold face represents the set of edges OUTGOING_z_EDGES.
The edges in COMPLETE_Q_EDGES and in SELF_LOOPS are omitted.
exists an edge from a node in X to z. From Property 5, z has no incoming edge, with the exception of the self loop,
hence z ∈ X. Since (z, u) ∈ OUTGOING_z_EDGES, there exists an edge from a node in X to u. This is a contradiction.
From Claim 1, the sequence S is constituted by the |V | + 1 nodes u1,u2, . . ., u|V | , z (in some order) and by a
node v ∈ Q. From Claim 2, z is the last node of the sequence S. Therefore, from Deﬁnition 4.1, there exists a set
of nodes X|V |+2 covering {v, u1, . . . , u|V | } such that there is no edge from vertices in X|V |+2 to z and |X|V |+2 |r .
Since the edge (z, z) ∈ SELF_LOOPS it holds that z /∈X|V |+2 , hence, X|V |+2 ⊆ V ∪ Q. Let Y|V |+1 = {u|V |+1k : uk ∈
X|V |+2 ∩ V } ∪ {u|V |+1k : uik ∈ X|V |+2 ∩Q, i = 1, . . . , |V | + 1}. Since X|V |+2 covers {u1, . . . , u|V | }, from Properties 6 and
7, it follows that Y|V |+1 covers {u1, . . . , u|V | }. Hence, Y|V |+1 covers {v, u1, . . . , u|V | }. If |Y|V |+1 |<r , we insert in Y|V |+1
other nodes from V|V |+1/Y|V |+1 , until |Y|V |+1 | = r . From Property 3, the set Y = {uk : u|V |+1k ∈ Y|V |+1} is a dominating
set of size r in G.
As an example, in the graph G of Fig. 2, {u1} is a dominating set of size one and u11u1u2u3z is a 1-almost_covered
sequence of length 5 in the graph G′ of Fig. 3, where X2 = {u11}, X3 = {u21}, X4 = {u31} and X5 = {u41}. 
5. Hierarchical key assignment schemes
The hierarchical access control problem is deﬁned in a scenario where the users of a computer system are organized
in a hierarchy formed by a certain number of disjoint classes. A hierarchy arises from the fact that some users have
more access rights than others. For example, there are several situations where supervisors have all the privileges to
control the tasks of their subordinates, while the subordinates have no privileges at all to access the supervisors’ tasks.
Similar situations abound in other areas, particularly in the government and military. Fig. 4 shows an example of a
hierarchical structure represented by a graph G= (V ,E), where the self loops and the edges of the set {(u, v)|u, v ∈ V
and there exists a path of length greater than 1 between u and v} are omitted.
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Fig. 4. Example of hierarchical structure.
5.1. Perfectly secure hierarchical key assignment schemes
In this section we consider hierarchical key assignment schemes where each key is secure against any coalition of
classes having size at most r = maxu∈V |Fu|. These schemes are called perfectly secure hierarchical key assignment
schemes.
We recall that a topological sort of a directed acyclic graph G = (V ,E) is a linear ordering of all its vertices such
that if G contains an edge (u, v), then u appears before v in the ordering.
The next lemma shows how to construct an r-almost_covered sequence when r = maxu∈V |Fu|.
Lemma 5.1. LetG=(V ,E) be the directed graph that represents a partially ordered hierarchy and let r=maxu∈V |Fu|.
In any perfectly secure hierarchical key assignment scheme for G, for any X ⊆ V , there exists an r-almost_covered
sequence whose length is |A
X
|.
Proof. Let X ⊆ V . We show how to construct an r-almost_covered sequence of classes in A
X
having length |A
X
|. Let
G′ be the directed acyclic subgraph induced by A
X
and let u|A
X
|u|A
X
|−1 · · · u2u1 be the sequence of classes output by
the topological sort on G′. This sequence has the property that for each edge (us, ut ) in G′, i.e., such that ut ∈ Aus , the
class us appears before than ut in the ordering. It is easy to see that u1u2 . . . u|A
X
| is an r-almost_covered sequence in
A
X
. Indeed, {u1, . . . , u|A
X
|} = AX and for any j = 2, . . . , |AX |, the set Xj = Fuj covers {u1u2 . . . uj−1}. 
Notice that the sequence constructed by Lemma 5.1 has maximum length, since it contains all classes in A
X
.
For example, consider the hierarchy shown in Fig. 4. It is easy to see that efc is a 2-almost_covered sequence of
maximum length in Ac = {c, e, f }.
The next theorem easily follows from Corollary 3.6 and Lemma 5.1.
Theorem 5.2. Let G = (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents a partially ordered hierarchy. In any perfectly
secure hierarchical key assignment scheme for G, for any X ⊆ V it holds that
H(P
X
) |A
X
|H(K).
The next corollary states that each class has to store a private information whose size is lower bounded by the sum
of the sizes of the keys assigned to all classes in its accessible set.
Corollary 5.3. Let G = (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents a partially ordered hierarchy. In any perfectly
secure hierarchical key assignment scheme for G, for any u ∈ V it holds that
H(Pu) |Au|H(K).
The next corollary shows that the amount of randomness needed by the CA to set up any key assignment scheme is
lower bounded by the sum of the sizes of the keys assigned to all classes in V .
Corollary 5.4. Let G = (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents a partially ordered hierarchy. In any perfectly
secure hierarchical key assignment scheme for G, it holds that
H(P
V
) |V |H(K).
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The bounds of Corollaries 5.3 and 5.4 are tight. Indeed, in Section 6.1 we show a perfectly secure hierarchical key
assignment scheme that meets the bounds.
5.2. Key assignment schemes for rooted tree hierarchies
In this section we consider key assignment schemes for an important kind of partially ordered hierarchy: the rooted
tree hierarchy. In a tree hierarchy, the accessible set Au of a class u is the set of classes in the subtree rooted at u. An
example of rooted tree hierarchy is shown in Fig. 5, where the self loops and the edges of the set {(u, v)|u, v ∈ V
and there exists a path of length greater than 1 between u and v} are omitted. The case of a rooted tree hierarchy was
also considered by Sandhu [22] in the computationally secure setting. In particular, Sandhu proposed a key assignment
scheme where each user holds exactly one key corresponding to its class and all users hold keys having the same size.
The key held by a class can be used to derive the keys of all descendant classes. We show that in the unconditionally
secure setting we need to distribute more information to each class, even if we require security only against a single
class.
Given a class u, we show how to construct an r-almost_covered sequence in Au. In the following we denote with gu
the degree of a class u, with {u1, . . . , ui} a set of i children of u, for each i = 1, . . . , gu, and with hu the height of u,
where
hu =
{
1 if u is a leaf class,
1 + maxgui=1 hui otherwise.
Lemma 5.5. LetG=(V ,E)be the directed graph that represents a rooted tree hierarchy. In any r-secure key assignment
scheme for G, for any u ∈ V and any t = 1, . . . , r , there exists a t-almost_covered sequence of classes in Au, whose
length Lu(t, hu) is expressed by the following recurrence:
Lu(t, hu) =
{1 if hu = 1,
1 +
s∑
i=1
Lui (t − s + i, hui ) otherwise,
where s = min{t, gu}.
Proof. Let h be the height of the tree. The proof is by induction on hu.
Let h = 1 and let u be a leaf class. It is easy to see that u is a t-almost_covered sequence of length one in Au, for
each t = 1, . . . , r .
Let h> 1.Assume by inductive hypothesis that for each u such that hu <h, there exists a t-almost_covered sequence
of classes in Au, whose length is Lu(t, hu) for each t = 1, . . . , r .
Let u be a class at height hu = h and let {u1, . . . , us} be a set of s children of u, where s = min{t, gu}. For any
i = 1, . . . , s, from the inductive hypothesis there exists a (t − s + i)-almost_covered sequence of classes in Aui , whose
length is Lui (t − s + i, hui ). Let Ws−i+1 be such a sequence, for i = 1, . . . , s. We ﬁrst prove the following claim.
Claim. The concatenation of the s sequences W1, . . . ,Ws is a t-almost_covered sequence of classes in Au.
Proof of the claim. W.l.o.g., let mi be the length of Wi and letMi =∑ij=1mj , for each i = 1, . . . , s. Assume that
the concatenation of the ﬁrst 1<ps − 1 sequences W1 . . .Wp is a t-almost_covered sequence of classes in Au. Let
v1 . . . vMp be such a sequence. FromDeﬁnition 3.2, we have to show that, for any j =2, . . . ,Mp,Mp+1, . . . ,Mp+1,
there exists a set Xj ⊆ Fj such that Xj covers {v1, . . . , vj−1} and |Xj | t . For each value of j = 2, . . . ,Mp,
a
d
cb
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Fig. 5. A rooted tree hierarchy.
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Deﬁnition 3.2 holds by inductive hypothesis. In the following we show that Deﬁnition 3.2 still holds for j =Mp +
1, . . . ,Mp+1. Since Wp+1 = vMp+1 . . . vMp+1 is a (t − p)-almost_covered sequence, from Deﬁnition 3.2 it holds
that for each j =Mp + 2, . . . ,Mp+1, there exists Yj ⊆ Fj such that Yj covers {vMp+1, . . . , vj−1} and |Yj | t − p.
Let YMp+1 = ∅. Let Xj = {u1, . . . , up} ∪ Yj , for each j =Mp + 1, . . . ,Mp+1. It easy to see that Xj covers{v1, . . . , vMp , vMp+1, . . . , vj−1}. Moreover, |Xj | = p + |Yj |p + t − p = t . Therefore, the concatenation of the s
sequences is a t-almost_covered sequence in Au.
Hence, there exists a t-almost_covered sequence of classes inAu, whose length is
∑s
i=1Lui (t−s+i, hui ). Moreover,
since {u1, . . . , us} ⊆ Fu, if we add the class u to the sequence, the resulting sequence is still t-almost_covered in Au.
Therefore, for each t = 1, . . . , r , there exists a t-almost_covered sequence of classes in Au, whose length is equal to
1 +∑si=1Lui (t − s + i, hui ). 
The next theorems easily follow from the previous lemma and from Corollaries 3.6 and 3.7, respectively.
Theorem 5.6. Let G = (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents a rooted tree hierarchy. In any r-secure key
assignment scheme for G, for any u ∈ V , it holds that
H(Pu)Lu(r, hu)H(K).
Theorem 5.7. Let G= (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents a rooted tree hierarchy. Let u be the root class. In
any r-secure key assignment scheme for G, it holds that
H(P
V
)Lu(r, hu)H(K).
The next lemma is a useful tool for the following results.
Lemma 5.8. Let G = (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents a rooted tree hierarchy. Let u ∈ V and let W be an
r-almost_covered sequence in Au of length m. The ﬁrst m− 1 classes of W are in at most r subtrees rooted in r children
of u.
Proof. Let Z be the set of the ﬁrst m − 1 classes of W and let v be the last class of W. Assume by contradiction that
the classes in Z are in p> r subtrees rooted in p children of u. Since W is r-almost_covered, from Deﬁnition 3.2 there
exists a set of classes X ⊆ Fv such that X covers Z and |X|r . It is easy to see that the smallest set in Fv that covers
Z has size greater or equal than p. Hence, |X|p> r . This contradicts Deﬁnition 3.2. Therefore, the classes in Z are
in at most r subtrees rooted in r children of u. 
Notice that, given a class u, we can compute a 1-almost_covered sequence inAu whose length is equal to hu. Indeed,
if r = 1 it holds that s = min{1, gu} = 1. Moreover, for each u, let u1 be the child of u with maximum height. By
induction, it is easy to see that Lu(1, hu) = 1 + Lu1(1, hu − 1) = hu.
The next lemma shows that, given a class u, any 1-almost_covered sequence in Au having length hu is a 1-
almost_covered sequence of maximum length.
Lemma 5.9. Let G = (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents a rooted tree hierarchy. In any 1-secure key
assignment scheme for G, for each u ∈ V , the length of any 1-almost_covered sequence in Au is less than or equal to
hu.
Proof. Let h be the height of the tree. The proof is by induction on hu.
Let h = 1 and let u be a leaf class (i.e. hu = 1). It easy to see that u is the unique t-almost_covered sequence in Au.
Let h> 1.Assume by inductive hypothesis that for each class u such that hu <h, the length of any 1-almost_covered
sequence in Au is less than or equal to hu.
Let u be a class at height hu = h. Assume by contradiction that there exists a 1-almost_covered sequence W in Au
whose length m is greater than hu. From Lemma 5.8 the ﬁrst m − 1 classes of W belong to a single subtree rooted in
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Fig. 6. A 3-complete tree hierarchy.
a child ui of u. It follows that there exists a 1-almost_covered sequence in Aui whose length is greater than hui . This
contradicts the inductive hypothesis. 
In the following we restrict our attention to key assignment schemes for g-complete tree hierarchies. We recall that
a g-complete tree is a tree in which all leaves have the same depth and all internal nodes have degree g.
Fig. 6 shows an example of a 3-complete tree hierarchy.Consider the classa in Fig. 6, it is easy to see that the sequences
fba, fgblca and efgbhicmda are, respectively, a 1-almost_covered , a 2-almost_covered and a 3-almost_covered sequence
in Aa .
Let u and v be two classes such that hu = hv . When the tree is g-complete, Lu(r, hu) = Lv(r, hv) and we denote
Lu(r, hu) with L(r, hu). The length of the r-almost_covered sequence computed by Lemma 5.5 in the accessible set
of a class does not depend on the ordering of its children. On the other hand, if the tree is not g-complete, the length of
the r-almost_covered sequence computed by Lemma 5.5 in the accessible set of a class could depend on the ordering
of its children. For example, consider the tree in Fig. 5. If a1 = b, the 2-almost_covered sequence in Aa has length 5.
Otherwise, if a1 = c, the 2-almost_covered sequence in Aa has length 6.
Lemma 5.10. Let G= (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents a rooted g-complete tree hierarchy. In any r-secure
key assignment scheme for G, for each u ∈ V the length of any t-almost_covered sequence in Au is less than or equal
to L(t, hu), for each t = 1, . . . , r .
Proof. Let h be the height of the tree. The proof is by induction on hu.
Let u be a leaf class (i.e. hu = 1). It easy to see that u is the unique t-almost_covered sequence in Au.
Assume by inductive hypothesis that for each u such that 1<hu <h, the length of any t-almost_covered sequence
in Au is less than or equal to L(t, hu), for each t = 1, . . . , r .
Let u be a class at height hu = h. Assume by contradiction that there exists a t-almost_covered sequence W in Au
whose length is m>L(t, hu), for each t = 1, . . . , r . From Lemma 5.8, the ﬁrst m − 1 classes of W are in at most t
subtrees rooted in t children of u. Moreover, since s = min{t, g}, the ﬁrst m − 1 classes of W are in 1ps subtrees
rooted in p children of u. Say u1, . . . , up be these p children of u. Let W ′ be the sequence obtained by W deleting the
last class. Since the tree is g-complete, the length of the longest sequence in Au computed by Lemma 5.5 does not
depend on the ordering of u’s children. W.l.o.g., we deﬁne the following ordering on u1, . . . , up: for any two indices
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , p}, if the ﬁrst class of Aui appearing in W ′ precedes the ﬁrst class of Auj appearing in W ′ then i > j .
Let Wi be the sequence of length mi obtained by W ′ extracting the classes in Aui , for each i = 1, . . . , p.
Since
∑p
i=1mi=m−1>L(t, hu)−1=
∑s
i=1L(t−s+i, hu−1)=
∑p
i=1L(t−s+i, hu−1)+
∑s
i=p+1L(t−s+i, hu−1),
there exists at least a sequenceWi such thatmi >L(t −s+ i, hu−1), for any i=1, . . . , p. First we prove the following
claim.
Claim. Wi is a (t − s + i)-almost_covered sequence in Aui .
Proof of the claim. Assumebycontradiction thatWi is not a (t−s+i)-almost_covered sequence.LetWi=v1v2 . . . vmi .
Since the sequence Wi is extracted by the t-almost_covered sequence W, from Deﬁnition 3.2, it holds that for
each j = 2, . . . , mi , there exists a set Xj ⊆ Fvj such that Xj covers {v1, v2 . . . vj−1}. Since Wi is not (t − s + i)-
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Fig. 7. A perfectly secure hierarchical key assignment scheme.
almost_covered, there exists at least an index j ∈ {2, . . . , mi} such that the smallest set Yj ⊆ Fvj covering
{v1, v2, . . . vj−1} has size |Yj |> t − s + i.
Since W is a t-almost_covered sequence, from Deﬁnition 3.2 there exists a set X ⊆ Fvj such that X covers the
set of classes preceding vj in W and |X| t . Since vj follows v1v2 . . . vj−1 in W it holds that |X| |Yj |. Moreover,
the ﬁrst class v1 of the sequence Wi follows at least a class in Aui′ , for each i
′ = i + 1, . . . , p, in the sequence
W. It is easy to see that the smallest set in Fv1 covering at least a class in p − i subtrees has size p − i. Hence,
|X|p − i + |Yj |>p − i + t − s + ip + t − p = t . This is a contradiction because W is t-almost_covered. Hence,
the sequence Wi is (t − s + i)-almost_covered.
Therefore, there exists a (t − s + i)-almost_covered sequence in Aui , where hui <hu, whose length is greater than
L(t − s + i, hui ). This contradicts the inductive hypothesis. 
6. Optimal constructions
In the following we propose some optimal constructions for unconditionally secure key assignment schemes. In our
schemes all keys assigned to classes have the same size.
6.1. Perfectly secure hierarchical key assignment scheme for partially ordered hierarchies
Let G = (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents a partially ordered hierarchy. The basic and straightforward
perfectly secure key assignment scheme for a partially ordered hierarchy is shown in Fig. 7.
For example, consider the hierarchy of Fig. 4. The scheme of Fig. 7 distributes information as follows:
a gets (ka, kb, kc, kd, ke, kf ), b gets (kb, kd, ke), c gets (kc, ke, kf ),
d gets (kd), e gets (ke), f gets (kf ).
It is easy to see that the scheme of Fig. 7 satisﬁes Deﬁnition 2.1. Indeed, each class v gets the key ku assigned to any
class u such that u ∈ Av , so Property 1 is satisﬁed. As for Property 2, since all keys are chosen by the CA, any |Fu|
keys do not have any information about the key ku assigned to class u.
The next theorem shows that the scheme is optimal both with respect to the size of the information kept secret by
each class and with respect to the randomness needed by the CA.
Theorem 6.1. The scheme of Fig. 7 is optimal both with respect to the bounds of Corollaries 5.3 and 5.4.
Proof. It is easy to see that the users in class u receive |Au| keys and since any key is randomly chosen in Zp, the
amount of the private information held by each class u is equal to |Au| logp, so the bound of Corollary 5.3 is met with
equality.
Since the CA needs to generate |V | distinct keys, one for each class, the amount of randomness needed by the CA
to set up the scheme of Fig. 7 is equal to |V | logp and the bound of Corollary 5.4 is met with equality. 
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6.2. A key assignment scheme for rooted tree hierarchies secure against a single class
Let G = (V ,E) be the directed graph that represents a rooted tree hierarchy. Let h be the height of the tree and let
g > 1 be the maximum degree of the tree. In Fig. 8 we describe a 1-secure key assignment scheme for a rooted tree
hierarchy. The amount of private information distributed to each class depends on its height. Fig. 9 shows an example
of the scheme.
The keys assigned to the classes in the rooted tree of Fig. 9 are computed as follows:
ka = y3, kb = ka + y2 modp, kc = ka + 2y2 modp,
kd = kb + y1 modp, ke = kb + 2y1 modp, kf = kc + y1 modp,
kg = kc + 2y1 modp.
Now we prove that the scheme of Fig. 8 satisﬁes Properties 1 and 2 of Deﬁnition 2.1.
Fig. 8. A 1-secure key assignment scheme for a rooted tree hierarchy.
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e
Fig. 9. Information distributed by the 1-secure scheme of Fig. 8.
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As for Property 1, we show that each class can compute the key for all classes in its accessible set. Let u be a class
at height hu > 1 and let v ∈ Au be a class at height hv , where 1hvhu − 1. It is easy to see that the key kv is a
function of the values yhv , . . . , yhu−1 and of the key ku. Since u holds the hu − 1 values y1, . . . , yhu−1 and its key ku,
then it can compute the key kv for class v.
In order to prove that the scheme of Fig. 8 satisﬁes Property 2 of Deﬁnition 2.1, we use the next deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6.2. Let u and v be two classes such that v ∈ Fu. The class v is called a strong class for u if and only if
u ∈ Aw, where w is the parent of v.
Fig. 10 shows a classiﬁcation of strong classes in the forbidden set of a class u. For example, given the tree in
Fig. 9, d and c are two strong classes for b of type 1 and 2, respectively; whereas, c is a strong class for d of type 3.
Notice that, given a class u, each class v′ ∈ Fu is in the accessible set of a strong class v for u. Indeed, v is the class
on the path starting from v′ to the root class, such that v ∈ Fu and u is in the accessible set of v’s parent. In the scheme
of Fig. 8, the information held by each class in the accessible set of a class v is contained in the private information
held by v. Hence, since a strong class has more information than any other class in its accessible set, in order to show
that any class in Fu cannot compute the key of class u, it is enough to consider only strong classes in Fu.
We need to prove that, given a class u, the probability that a strong class v ∈ Fu computes the key ku, assigned to u, is
equal to 1/p. For the sake of simplicity, in the following we will assume that the tree is g-complete; this simpliﬁcation
is not reductive, indeed when the tree is g-complete, the amount of the information held by each class is greater than
or equal to the amount of the information held by the class if the tree is not g-complete.
From Fig. 10 we have to analyze the following three cases:
Case 1: Let u be a class such that 1<huh and let v be the t-th child of u, where t =1, . . . , gu. From the information
distribution phase, the class v holds its key and the values y1, . . . , yhv−1. From the key generation phase, it is easy to
see that ku is a function of the values yhu, . . . , yh. Since the values y1, . . . , yh are randomly chosen by the CA, the
values y1, . . . , yhv−1 do not help class v to compute the key ku. From Fig. 8, the key ku assigned to class u is the
constant term of the polynomial qu(x) = ku + yhu−1modp whose degree is one and kv is the evaluation of qu(x) in
t. Hence, in order to compute ku, v has to solve one equation in two unknowns. For any of the p possible choices for
yhu−1 there is a corresponding value for the key ku. Hence, the probability that v computes the key ku assigned to class
u is equal to 1/p.
Case 2: Let u be a class such that 1hu <h and let v be a brother of u. Let w be their parent. From Fig. 8, the key
kw of w is the constant term of the polynomial qw(x) whose degree is one. The keys ku and kv are the evaluations
of qw(x) in two different points. Assume by contradiction that v can compute ku with probability greater than 1/p, it
follows that v can also compute kw. This is a contradiction, indeed w is the parent of v (see Case 1).
Case 3: Let hv >hu. Let w be an ancestor of u such that hw = hv . Since v is a strong class, w is a brother of v.
It is easy to see that ku is a function of kw and of yhw−1, . . . , yhu . From the information distribution phase v holds
yhw−1, . . . , yhu . Assume by contradiction that v can compute ku with probability greater than 1/p, it follows that v can
also compute kw. This is a contradiction, indeed w is a brother of v (see Case 2).
Hence, the probability that any class v ∈ Fu computes the key ku assigned to class u is equal to 1/p.
The next theorem shows that the scheme is optimal both with respect to the size of the information kept secret by
each class and with respect to the randomness needed by the CA.
Theorem 6.3. The scheme of Fig. 8 is optimal both with respect to the bounds of Theorems 5.6 and 5.7.
Fig. 10. Classiﬁcation of strong classes in the forbidden set of a class u.
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Proof. It is easy to see that each class u, at height hu, receives the hu − 1 values y1, . . . , yhu−1 and its key ku from the
CA. Hence, the size of the information distributed to class u is equal to hu logp and the bound of Theorem 5.6 is met
with equality.
The root class is the class at height h. During the initialization phase the CA generates h values y1, . . . , yh. Hence,
the size of private information generated by CA is equal to h logp and the bound of Theorem 5.7 is met with equality.

7. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed an information-theoretic approach to the access control problem in a scenario where
a group of users is divided into a number of disjoint classes. Our approach does not depend on any speciﬁc unproven
assumption. We have considered key assignment schemes which are unconditionally secure against attacks carried out
by a coalition of classes of a certain size. We have shown lower bounds on the size of the private information that each
class has to store and on the amount of randomness needed by the CA to set up any key assignment scheme. Finally,
we have proposed some optimal constructions for unconditionally secure key assignment schemes.
Appendix
In this appendix we review the basic concepts of Information Theory used in our deﬁnitions and proofs. For a
complete treatment of the subject the reader is advised to consult [6].
Given a probability distribution {PrX(x)}x∈X on a set X, we deﬁne the entropy1 of X, H(X), as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
PrX(x) logPrX(x).
The entropy satisﬁes the following property:
0H(X) log |X|,
where H(X) = 0 if and only if there exists x0 ∈ X such that PrX(x0) = 1; whereas, H(X) = log |X| if and only if
PrX(x) = 1/|X|, for all x ∈ X.
Given two setsX andY and a joint probability distribution on their Cartesian product, the conditional entropyH(X|Y),
is deﬁned as
H(X|Y) = −
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
PrY(y)Pr(x|y) logPr(x|y).
From the deﬁnition of conditional entropy it is easy to see that
H(X|Y)0.
Given n sets X1, . . . , Xn and a joint probability distribution on their Cartesian product, the entropy of X1 . . .Xn can
be expressed as
H(X1 . . .Xn) = H(X1) +
n∑
i=2
H(Xi |X1 . . .Xi−1). (A.1)
Given n+1 sets X1, . . . , Xn, Y and a joint probability distribution on their Cartesian product, the entropy of X1 . . .Xn
given Y can be expressed as
H(X1 . . .Xn|Y) = H(X1|Y) +
n∑
i=2
H(Xi |X1 . . .Xi−1Y). (A.2)
1All log’s in this paper denote basis 2 logarithms.
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The mutual information I (X;Y) between X and Y is deﬁned by
I (X;Y) = H(X) − H(X|Y) (A.3)
and satisﬁes the following properties:
I (X;Y) = I (Y;X)
and I (X;Y)0, from which one gets
H(X)H(X|Y). (A.4)
Given three sets X, Y,Z and a joint probability distribution on their Cartesian product, the conditional mutual infor-
mation I (X;Y|Z) between X and Y given Z is
I (X;Y|Z) = H(X|Z) − H(X|ZY) (A.5)
and satisﬁes the following properties:
I (X;Y|Z) = I (Y;X|Z)
and I (X;Y|Z)0. Since the conditional mutual information is always non negative we get
H(X|Z)H(X|ZY). (A.6)
From (A.2) and (A.6) one easily gets that for any sets Y,X1, . . . , Xn and a joint probability distribution on their
Cartesian product it holds that
n∑
i=1
H(Xi |Y)H(X1X2 . . .Xn|Y). (A.7)
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